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here is renewed interest in the intrahousehold 
allocation of welfare, particularly among 
economists studying poor countries where 
even slight differences can have dramatic conse-
quences on child and female nutrition, morbidity, 
and mortality. The evidence collected so far tends to 
demonstrate that the allocation of consumption and 
leisure among household members varies systemat-
ically with their relative contributions to household 
total income. These results, however, provide no 
guidance as to which policies affect intrahousehold 
outcomes. Various efforts have been made to fill this 
lacuna, focusing on the determinants of intrahouse-
hold resource allocation. Some research has 
emphasized the influence that outside options are 
likely to have on spouses’ bargaining power and 
hence on intrahousehold welfare. If this approach is 
correct, one may hope to affect intrahousehold 
welfare by improving the “exit options” of disad-
vantaged groups. 
  Two main categories of exit options have been 
proposed by the literature, namely noncooperation 
within an existing household and separation from the 
household. Support for both is found in the litera-
ture. Control over assets during marriage, including 
the right to decide how to 
allocate one’s own labor effort, 
has been shown to affect the 
individual income of African 
women. Some research has also 
demonstrated that the attribu-
tion of welfare funds to specific 
household members affects con-
sumption patterns. Unfortunate-
ly, progress has been hampered by the lack of hard 
evidence on the noncooperative options open to 
women in developing countries. 
 
Gaps in the Research on Intrahousehold 
Allocation in Poor Rural Areas 
In studies of intrahousehold allocation in poor rural 
areas of developing countries, economists have re-
lied on anthropological accounts of patrimonial 
customs, vague generalities about marriage and 
divorce practices, or legal principles that only affect 
relationships between households. Rules regarding 
the disposition of household assets upon divorce or 
death often pursue multiple objectives, such as the 
preservation of viable economic units, the protection 
of underage children, and the protection of groups 
that traditionally specialize in home goods. Little is 
known, however, of how customary patrimonial law 
handles these issues in poor rural areas of devel-
oping countries. 
 
How This Study Helps Fill the Research Gap 
Using data from the 1997 Ethiopian Rural House-
hold Survey (ERHS), this paper seeks to document 
how the control, ownership, and disposition of pro-
ductive assets within households is de facto orga-
nized in rural Ethiopia. To our knowledge, this is the 
first effort to document patrimonial customs using a 
large household survey and rigorous statistical 
analysis. 
  Ethiopia is an ideal place for this type of 
research because of its wide diversity of cultures and 
patrimonial traditions. Different religions, with 
widely divergent views 
regarding matrimonial 
issues in general, and the 
status of women in par-
ticular, are well repre-
sented and, in fact, tend 
to dominate different 
parts of the country. 
Anthropological evi-
dence seems to indicate that as one moves from 
north to south in Ethiopia, women’s status, and 
therefore possibly their bargaining power, declines. 
While much of this diversity was captured in the 
ERHS, generalizations should be viewed cautiously, 
given that the ethnic, cultural, and geographic 
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“Contrary to what is often assumed in 
empirical work on intrahousehold 
issues, the evidence shows that 
ownership of assets, control within 
marriage, and disposition upon death 
or divorce only partially overlap.”  
  Theory predicts that the bargaining power of 
household members depends on expected utility 
upon divorce (which is determined by the devolution 
of assets) and expected utility in a noncooperative 
marriage (which presumably depends on control 
over assets within marriage). To identify these 
factors, researchers have typically used a variety of 
measures, such as dowry and bride-price, ownership 
of assets at and during marriage, control during 
marriage, and legal rules regarding the disposition 
upon dissolution due to divorce or death. Due to data 
limitations, these measures have typically been 
regarded as closely related. Very little empirical 
evidence, however, is available on the extent to 
which dowry, bride-price, and assets brought to 
marriage can be used to predict control during 
marriage and division of assets upon divorce or 
death—the two processes thought to influence 
bargaining power. This paper fills this lacuna using 
the data from Ethiopia. 
 
Results 
Using the household-level data obtained from the 
ERHS, we examined the distribution of control and 
ownership of productive assets among husband and 
wife in rural Ethiopia. Contrary to what is often 
assumed in empirical work on intrahousehold issues, 
the evidence shows that ownership of assets, control 
within marriage, and disposition upon death or 
divorce only partially overlap. Rules regarding 
divorce and inheritance vary dramatically between 
different locations. Disposition upon death or 
divorce only loosely depends on individual owner-
ship during marriage, while assets brought into 
marriage have little impact on disposition upon 
death, but matter in case of divorce. Control over 
productive resources tends to be centralized into the 
hands of the household head, be it a man or a 
woman, irrespective of ownership at or after mar-
riage. Control over assets is associated with larger 
claims over these assets upon divorce, a finding 
consistent with the presence of incentive problems. 
 
Caveats 
While making a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of women’s status in rural Ethiopia, 
the present analysis does not address all the dimen-
sions of women’s welfare. Communal norms defin-
ing informal entitlements for women might substi-
tute for weak inheritance rights. For instance, the 
community may choose to house and feed widows 
and wives of villagers drafted into the army, or free 
access to communal resources may partly com-
pensate the negative effect of patrimonial laws and 
customs on women. We chose to ignore entitlements 
and focus on rights because the latter are more easily 
identifiable. 
  Another shortcoming of our approach is that 
women’s rights might be constrained by norms of 
behavior, such as the implicit obligation for women 
to remarry lest they be treated as outcast. Again we 
have chosen to abstract from these phenomena, not 
because they are unimportant, but because they are 
harder to measure and analyze statistically. 
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